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Abstract: China has modified its pollution control policy system with 
such price tools as the pollution charge (PC) policy and the payment for 
initial emission allowance (PIEA) policy. The aim of PC policy is to 
compensate for the environment damage caused by pollutants, while PIEA is 
in charge of the initial emission allowance (IEA) within the emission 
trading system (ETS). However, since the implementation of PIEA, it has 
been criticized as redundant because of the similar pricing scheme with 
the PC. In addition, the existing PIEA pricing approaches have ignored 
interactions with other policies, such as PC and total emission control 
(TEC) policies. In this research, we established an optimal control-based 
model with chemical oxygen demand (COD) and ammoniacal nitrogen (NH3-N), 
two independent pollutants variables, to simulate the water pollutants' 
PIEA price. Simulation results indicated that emission quantity and 
optimal social benefit in the PC-PIEA combination scenario was equal to 
the situation in the PIEA scenario. Under this design, PC compensated for 
the emission damage, and PIEA paid for the scarcity rent, while PIEA does 
not duplicate the PC policy. In addition, the PIEA policy has a complex 
effect on pollutant emission. Because PIEA policy increases the 
enterprises' discharging cost, most regions' COD emissions are less than 
the baseline, excepting Beijing, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, 
Shandong, and Guangdong, in which emission quantities are greater than 
the baseline. The NH3-N emission shows an opposite trend. The simulation 
result is that excluding Inner Mongolia, Hubei, Hunan, Tibet, Gansu, 
Qinghai, Ningxia, and Xinjiang, the NH3-N emissions in the rest of 
regions are increased. TEC policy has a significant effect on pollutant 
emissions and the PIEA price. The COD emission quantity with TEC is lower 
than that without the TEC policy, therefore, the TEC policy will be 
effective for pollutant emission control. The pollutant beyond the 
restricted target will be charged a payment for IEA at a higher price 
than without the TEC policy. 
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Reviewer #1:  
1. Too little is described and defined social benefits. 
 
A: The details of social benefit are described in P 11 Line 15. 
 
2. No comparison of the method and model of the other. 
 
A: Some comparisons are elaborate in P 9 Line 16 methodology part. 
 
3. What are the penalties, ie. What value and what character. 
 
A: The detail explanation of the penalty function in SI in the P S5 Line 23. The 
penalty function in this study is actually a method used in the algorithm to deal with 
constraints, rather than intuitive understanding of the environmental policy used to 
punish excessive means of discharge and its standards. 
 
*Detailed Response to Reviewers
4. What is the practical aspect of the model and studies? Is it just the diagnosis or the 
use of theses and practical results-appropriate decisions / Case Study/. 
 
A: The practical application of this study is the pricing method designed for China's 
implementation of the PIEA policy. The PIEA Policy is piloted in 12 regions, and 
each region choose pricing method by their own decision. The most of pilot regions 
take treatment cost as pricing method for convenience, but does not take into account 
the existing policies, so this study is promoted. 
 
5. What about the computational complexity. 
 
A: Computational process is complex indeed, since words limited, all details cannot 
be described excepting briefly calculated steps and algorithms listed in the article. In 
order to calculate coefficients and parameters required by pricing model, we also need 
to set up some auxiliary models. These calculations are listed in SI. After modeling, 
simulation and solution are also important parts of the work. Solution algorithm is 
shown in the article. 
 
6. Is obtained optimal solution or sub-optimal / simulation /. 
 
A: Due to various restrictions, the impact on the environment is temporarily only 
pollutant emissions; the health impact has not been included in the study. The reasons 
why health effects incorporating into the study are explained in research limitation 
section. 
 
7. No information about the implementation of the model / environment, tools and 
solvers etc./ 
 
A: The calculation tool uses the MATLAB software, and the solution algorithm is 
listed in SI. 
 
Reviewer #2:  
The paper studies the design of payment for initial emission allowance pricing 
approach based on optimal control theory. It is an important and interesting piece of 
work, and is relevant to real word problems. Nevertheless, I do have some concerns: 
 
1. The current introduction section does not pinpoint the theoretical problem of prior 
research, and fails to highlight the intended contribution of the study. I'd suggest the 
authors to clearly spell out why this study is important, what's the gap in this literature, 
also how this study intends to contribute to the literature. 
 
A: We rewrote the introduction section in accordance with the reviewers ' 
recommendations, highlighting why the study was important, what the existing 
research was, and the contribution of this study. 
 
2. This may be not easy without a meaningful comparison with similar research in the 
literature. The literature review should be extended.  As far as my understanding, 
many relevant references are missing. 
 
A: In previous version, the literature review focus on the topic of initial emission 
allowance pricing, and the content of the discussion was limited. Following the 
reviewers ' suggestions, we extended the topic literature review to relevant resource 
pricing.  We try to modify the paper better, but do not know if follow the instruction 
of topic proposed by reviewers, if there is more detailed advice, please let us know. 
 
3. In section 3 Case and data, the authors only outlining the data sources without 
much discussion of the case. More information about the case will useful here.  
 
A: We added information in the data collection section. 
 4.The simulation results Section is also weak. The authors only describe the results. 
No clear insights are drawn. I haven't learned anything from this manuscript from the 
environmental policy research viewpoint. 
 
A: This study focuses on to establish a pricing method that is applicable to the 
implementation of the PIEA policy with the existing complex policies background. 
The previously version does not show the policy recommendations legible. Following 
the reviewers' suggestions, we reorganized the narrative of results, and list the 
viewpoints. 
 
5. No policy implications are discussed. The conclusion should focus more on the 
practical implications and policy implications of your article. Although the main 
findings are summarized, what are the implications of these findings to the industrial 
firms or government policy makers? It is not entirely clear to me how the theory 
developed can be applied and used for policy evaluation. 
 
A: As reviewer’s suggestion, we add theory information about pricing method in 
theoretical analysis section to help understand how the theory can be applied and used 
for policy evaluation. Then we elaborate the implications of the research findings in 
discussion section. 
 
6. The authors need to more critically discuss the research limitations and how these 
limitations inform further research in the future. 
 
A: More information about research limitation is listed in discussion section. 
 
7. There are some problems with grammar and sentence structure through the paper. 
Attention should be paid to avoid grammatical errors. 
 
A: We try our best to correct grammatical errors and polish the article. 
 
Reviewer #3:  
This manuscript creatively established an optimal control-based model with two 
independent pollutants variables, chemical oxygen demand(COD) and ammoniacal 
nitrogen(NH3-N), to simulate water pollutants payment for initial emission 
allowance(PIEA). The model establishment is reasonable and feasible. The previous 
mistaken understanding of pollution charges(PC) and PIEA has been proposed and 
corrected, and the influence of other policies, PC and total emission control(TEC) for 
example, has been taken into consideration. Besides, the interaction between two 
pollutants index, COD and NH3-N, has been discussed, according to the simulation 
result. The conclusion of this manuscript has a critical reference value for the PIEA 
price setting in china.  
A few major revisions are listed as follow: 
 
 1) As it is mentioned in P8 Line 26, maximum social benefit is the object of PIEA 
optimal model. But in the Formula (7) and (9), they are about the enterprise profits in 
different scenarios. It is kind of difficult to obtain the stimulated results about optimal 
social benefit, best pollution emission quantity and PIEA price based on the Formula 
(7) and (9) directly.  
 
A: Thank you for your attention to the details of the model. Due to length limitation 
of the article, some details are omitted. Here is a more detailed explanation. Formula 
(6) represents the social benefit, and the formulas (8) and (10) represent the individual 
business benefits of Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 respectively. In formula (8),    and 
   represent initial payment price for COD and NH3-N, and   
         and 
  
         represent firm COD and NH3-N emissions. (The process of establishing 
the function of enterprise's profit function and the social benefit function, including 
the details how to establish the pollutant emissions function is described in SI, instead 
of describing in main text.) The section in P 10 Line 8 describes the process how to 
find the initial allowance price that achieves optimal social benefit. “In the first stage, 
the policy maker offers a series of PIEA prices according to an area with several 
enterprises. In the second stage, enterprises take countermeasures. Increasing costs 
will decrease the enterprises’ profits after the PIEA policy has been implemented. 
Supposing that the enterprise is an ‘economic man’ who chases the maximum benefit; 
thus, the enterprise will take measures if the profit decrease is beyond the acceptable 
range. Two types of strategies are available to adopt by the enterprise: adjust the 
production output or raise the pollution reduction investment. The enterprise chooses 
the best suitable measure in accordance with the maximum profit principle. In the 
third stage, the policy maker decides which price will be taken for the benefits. The 
policy maker will measure the social benefit aimed at every price and choose the price 
that will maximize the social benefit.” Following description is easier to understand, 
the optimal social benefit is the objective solution, the best pollution emission is the 
emission when achieving objective solution, and the initial allowance price is the 
condition when pollutants are controlled at the best emission. 
Thus, the equations are available for obtaining the stimulated results about optimal 
social benefit, best pollution emission quantity and PIEA price. 
 
 2) It is noted that the Table 1 has not mentioned the information what is introduced in 
P11 Line 15-16. 
 
A: It’s our mistake in labeling, and we correct the mistake: the information about 
initial allowance price mentioned in P19 Line 10 is introduced in Fig 7 and Fig 8.  
 
3) The relationship between PC and PIEA has been discussed many times in the 
whole manuscript. It would be better to be discussed in two aspects, in optimal social 
benefit and in PIEA price setting, separately. 
 
A: Following the reviewer’s instruction, we make the paragraph clear organized. 
 
4) The structure of the manuscript is not clearly. Results, discussions and conclusions 
part are not proper. Especially the conclusions, it is not listed by points, and it is not 
well matched what has mentioned in the abstract and introduction.  
 
A: We arrange the narrative order by following the structure that results, discussions 
and conclusions. The results part shows the optimal social benefit, best pollution 
emission and initial allowance price. The discussions part includes policy implication 
and research limitation. The conclusion part summaries the results and lists them by 
points. 
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Abstract 14 
China has modified its pollution control policy system with such price tools as the pollution 15 
charge (PC) policy and the payment for initial emission allowance (PIEA) policy. The aim of 16 
PC policy is to compensate for the environment damage caused by pollutants, while PIEA is 17 
in charge of the initial emission allowance (IEA) within the emission trading system (ETS). 18 
However, since the implementation of PIEA, it has been criticized as redundant because of 19 
the similar pricing scheme with the PC. In addition, the existing PIEA pricing approaches 20 
have ignored interactions with other policies, such as PC and total emission control (TEC) 21 
policies. In this research, we established an optimal control-based model with chemical 22 
oxygen demand (COD) and ammoniacal nitrogen (NH3-N), two independent pollutants 23 
variables, to simulate the water pollutants’ PIEA price. Simulation results indicated that 24 
emission quantity and optimal social benefit in the PC–PIEA combination scenario was equal 25 
to the situation in the PIEA scenario. Under this design, PC compensated for the emission 26 
damage, and PIEA paid for the scarcity rent, while PIEA does not duplicate the PC policy. In 27 
addition, the PIEA policy has a complex effect on pollutant emission. Because PIEA policy 28 
increases the enterprises’ discharging cost, most regions’ COD emissions are less than the 29 
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 2 
baseline, excepting Beijing, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, and Guangdong, 1 
in which emission quantities are greater than the baseline. The NH3-N emission shows an 2 
opposite trend. The simulation result is that excluding Inner Mongolia, Hubei, Hunan, Tibet, 3 
Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, and Xinjiang, the NH3-N emissions in the rest of regions are 4 
increased. TEC policy has a significant effect on pollutant emissions and the PIEA price. The 5 
COD emission quantity with TEC is lower than that without the TEC policy, therefore, the 6 
TEC policy will be effective for pollutant emission control. The pollutant beyond the 7 
restricted target will be charged a payment for IEA at a higher price than without the TEC 8 
policy. 9 
Keywords: pricing; payment; initial emission allowance; optimal control-based; 10 
chemical oxygen demand; ammoniacal nitrogen 11 
 12 
1. Introduction 13 
The natural environment not only provides human beings with a habitat for survival but is 14 
also involved in manufacturing processes as a factor of production. In addition to providing 15 
natural resources, the environment receives pollution produced by manufacturing processes. 16 
It is well-known that environmental capacity to receive pollutant emissions is a type of 17 
natural resource. Environmental capacity resources are limited, while the demand for it is 18 
growing; therefore, people need to measure the cost and benefits to use resources efficiently. 19 
The cost of using environmental capacity resources is primarily caused by its external 20 
damage, but the government employs a methodology to internalize externalities to make the 21 
beneficiaries undertake the real environmental costs. When calculating the benefits of 22 
environmental resources, the scarcity rents are often overlooked. The Chinese government 23 
implemented the payment for initial emission allowance (PIEA) policy to capture scarcity 24 
rents for environmental capacity resources. 25 
The PIEA policy arises from the actual demand of the emission trading policy. In the initial 26 
stage of emission trading, the manager allocated the allowance to enterprises by some rules 27 
for free. Free allocation causes a lot of problems. Unpaid emission allowances are for 28 
existing enterprises, and new entrants are required to purchase allowances from the emissions 29 
trading market. Compared to the new entrants that have to pay for the allowance, the 30 
enterprises that receive the allowance for free are basically receiving a subsidy(Bovenberg et 31 
al., 2005). In addition, with free allowances, the enterprises lack incentives and pressure to 32 
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 3 
reduce emissions(Goulder et al., 2010). Unpaid allowances make enterprises using 1 
environmental capacity resources inefficient, and the enterprises tend to use more allowances 2 
than they need. Furthermore, allocating allowances for free promotes manager power 3 
rent-seeking, that is, enterprises will attempt to obtain special approval for allowances(Gu, 4 
2007).  5 
To avoid the free allowance as a subsidy for enterprises, to improve the efficiency of resource 6 
allocation and to avoid rent-seeking behavior in allocating, the Chinese government launched 7 
the PIEA policy in 2008. The policy stipulates that for chemical oxygen demand (COD), 8 
ammoniacal nitrogen (NH3-N), sulfur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxide (NOX) four pollutants, 9 
enterprises should pay for the emission allowance that they obtained(General Office of the 10 
State Council, 2014). 11 
The practical significance of the PIEA policy is to meet the needs for an initial allowance 12 
allocation in the first stage of the emissions trading market, since managers gradually realized 13 
that if the demands for allowances are adequate, unrestricted rights to use them will lead to an 14 
overextension of resources, and the scarcity rents of resources are wasted. Therefore, 15 
additional policies are needed to ensure the sustainable use of resources. Since charging 16 
appropriate scarcity rents for depleted resources can keep resource consumption at a 17 
sustainable level (Hartwick, 1977), the PIEA policy has been implemented. 18 
The initial emission allowance price as results of this study could be in support of the policy 19 
implementation. In addition, the price is not only for the initial emission allowance but also 20 
actually shows the scarcity rents for environmental capacity resources, meaning that the price 21 
calculation method in this study could be implemented in resource value accounting. 22 
 23 
2. Literature Review 24 
In the PIEA policy, the allowance price is the key factor; thus, how to price allowances is a 25 
concern of researchers. Many researchers studied methods for pricing initial emission 26 
allowances. The market price method is conveniently used in pricing allowance. Several 27 
researchers employed an auction to pricing emission allowance, such as the CO2 emission 28 
allowance within the EU emissions trading system (EU ETS)(Watanabe and Robinson, 2005), 29 
carbon monoxide (CO), volatile organic compounds (VOC), sulfur dioxide (SO2)(Karl, 1992), 30 
and nitrogen oxides (NOX)(Napolitano et al., 2007) in the United States Clean Air Act 31 
(CAA)(McCarthy et al., 2007) and COD, NH3-N, SO2 and NOX in the China PIEA 32 
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 4 
policy(Xiao et al., 2001). The auction method has advantages for pricing allowance. 1 
Compared to the free allocation method, the auction method will generate income, thereby 2 
reducing the government's dependence on ordinary taxes (Andrew Muller et al., 2002; Parry, 3 
1997). Auction revenue also leads to a revenue-recycling effect that reduces tax distortions 4 
(Goulder et al., 1999; Muller et al., 2002; Parry, 1997). In the carbon emissions trading 5 
market, the allocation of initial allowance has significant impacts on price and allocation 6 
efficiency, and auctions tend to reduce price and marginal cost differences, while free 7 
allocation tends to amplify the differences (Burtraw et al., 2001). The auctions will encourage 8 
companies to implement effective technical innovations(Milliman and Prince, 1989; Popp, 9 
2003). However, the auction method has several drawbacks. As a market-based mechanism, 10 
an auction is considered to be able to allocate resources efficiency and generate income, but 11 
when the auction is applied to negative externality products, the effect on consumer welfare 12 
and social welfare is uncertain (Li, 2015). In addition, in the EPA's emissions trading market, 13 
auction settings may cause both buyers and sellers to underestimate the allowance value, 14 
leading to lower efficiency in the emission trading market (Cason, 1993), and when the seller 15 
can set the bid price, it will distort the market efficiency (Dijkstra and Haan, 2001). Thus, 16 
researchers seek pricing methods other than auctions. 17 
PIEA is charging for the environmental capacity to collect scarcity rent, which means 18 
“missing money”(Fullertona and Metcalf, 2001; Zöttl, 2011); therefore, several researchers 19 
adopted a pricing approach for natural resources. In the US SO2 emission trading, the shadow 20 
price of the SO2 emission reduction is estimated using the output distance function, which is 21 
considered to be the allowance price (Coggins and Swinton, 1996; Fare et al., 2007). Several 22 
researchers believe that the initial emission allowance price is related to the cost of using the 23 
environmental capacity resources. The environmental self-purification capacity is regarded as 24 
environmental capacity resource, and its price is equivalent to its marginal opportunity cost 25 
(Zhang, 1996).  The cost recovery method was used to assess the price of environmental 26 
capacity and took the price as the reference for the initial emission allowance price (Bi et al., 27 
2007). Similarly, it is  believed that the price paid for the initial emission allowance is based 28 
on the value of the environmental capacity resources; therefore, pollution control costs could 29 
be used as a reference for pricing (Ye et al., 2011).  30 
Other researchers believe that the price of the initial emissions allowance from the costs and 31 
benefits of using environmental capacity should be considered, especially the damage caused 32 
by the pollution emitted to the environment. The costs and benefits were took as a 33 
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 5 
consideration for the initial emissions allowance price model (Huang and Wu, 2004). An 1 
initial allowance pricing strategy was established based on the value of water environmental 2 
capacity, and the pricing strategy considered the economic value and ecological value of 3 
water environmental capacity, as well as the differences between regions and industries (Yu 4 
et al., 2012). 5 
In the abovementioned studies, only the manager participates in pricing. However, when 6 
manager and enterprises are involved in the pricing process, the pricing process becomes a 7 
game process. From the perspective of a dynamic game, the evolution of the strategy of the 8 
manager and enterprises in the formulation of the allowance price were analyzed, which 9 
provides a reference for the government to formulate a fair and effective pricing model of the 10 
initial allowance (Xia et al., 2010). The cooperative game theory was employed to construct 11 
the Nash-Bargaining pricing model for the initial allowance of the Tai lake industry based on 12 
multi-stakeholder cooperation (Liu et al., 2012). 13 
Researchers discussed varied kinds of pricing approaches, several methods have been applied 14 
in practice, and others remained at the theoretical stage. Observing these approaches from an 15 
independent perspective, each approach has different considerations. However, when the 16 
Chinese environmental policy framework is taken into account, certain approaches ignore the 17 
interaction with existing policies (del Río González, 2007).  18 
Prior to the PIEA policy, China embarked on policies related to environmental capacity 19 
resources such as the pollution charge (PC) policy and the total emission control (TEC) 20 
policy. Next, we focus on the following questions: the pollution charges paid by enterprises 21 
in the PC policy as compensation for environmental damage is a part of the value for 22 
environmental capacity resources. The payment for the initial allowance is also for 23 
environmental capacity resources. The interaction between the PIEA and PC was not 24 
considered in the pricing approach mentioned above. Does the payment for compensation 25 
affect the allowance price in the PIEA policy? In the PC policy, the industrial average 26 
treatment cost was used in calculating the payment of pollution charge calculation(Wang, 27 
2005). In the abovementioned initial allowance pricing approaches, some methods involved 28 
using the average treatment cost, therefore the pricing approach had been criticized as being 29 
redundant because the same pricing approach was adopted with the pollution charges 30 
(PC)(Zhang et al., 2015). 31 
The allowance price is relative to the allowance quantity, and the allowance quantity for one 32 
region is determined by this region’s total emission control (TEC) cap(Goulder, 2013). The 33 
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 6 
effect of the TEC policy on the PIEA price is ignored. Does this emission restriction affect 1 
the allowance price?  2 
The PIEA policy for water pollutants refer to chemical oxygen demand (COD) and 3 
ammoniacal nitrogen (NH3-N) pollutants, and the two pollutants have a synergistic effect in 4 
the treatment process (Eddy et al., 2014; Loosdrecht et al., 2016).When the enterprise 5 
attempts to reduce one pollutant, the other pollutant is also reduced accordingly(Patwardhan, 6 
2008). In previous studies, all approaches calculated the COD and NH3-N pollutant price 7 
individually without considering the synergistic effect on the pollutant treatment process. 8 
Therefore, when pricing the initial emission allowance, the synergistic effect should be 9 
considered. 10 
In addition to pricing, the policy maker pays close attention to the influence after policy is 11 
implemented. There are few studies on effect of PIEA policy implementation and the changes 12 
in pollutant emission quantity. Because it is difficult to separate the PIEA policy effect from 13 
other policies such as TEC and PC, it is difficult to quantify the environmental benefit from 14 
the PIEA policy(Ye et al., 2011). 15 
This research design utilizes the PIEA pricing approach based on optimal control theory. 16 
With this pricing approach, the PIEA policy avoids duplicating the PC policy and takes other 17 
relative policy interactions into consideration. Additionally, we clarify the effect of PIEA 18 
policy implementation and whether the PIEA price is affected by other relative policies. The 19 
result shows the prices in different policy-assembled scenarios. The findings also suggest 20 
similar best emission quantities in different PC–PIEA policy-assembled scenarios. Finally, 21 
we summarize the study and provide subjects for future research. 22 
 23 
3. Theoretical Analysis 24 
The pollution discharge from humans and business will affect the environment or even harm 25 
the environment, but the implementation of zero emissions is also irrational according to the 26 
cost-benefit analysis. In fact, the natural environment can absorb a certain amount of 27 
pollution, and managers should control the pollutant emissions to an acceptable limitation. 28 
Therefore, the problem of how to measure the acceptable level of pollution needs to be 29 
solved by policy designers. 30 
There are two methods to set the acceptable pollutant emission level: one is setting the 31 
environmental exposure concentration of pollutants corresponding to the degree of acceptable 32 
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 7 
risk that affects human health and calculating the regional environmental capacity based on 1 
the environmental quality criteria for the region; the other is the "best pollutant emission" 2 
after the cost-benefit analysis (Tietenberg and Lewis, 2016). 3 
Pollution discharge is known to produce benefits and damages; the effective emission level is 4 
to maximize the net benefit in a simple static pollutant model. The emission level when 5 
achieving the max net benefit is equivalent to the emission level when the externalities are 6 
fully internalized. According to the optimal condition, we can observe that the net benefit of 7 
pollution can only be maximized when the marginal benefit of pollution is equal to the 8 
marginal damage. As shown in Fig 1, when the pollution marginal damage curve and 9 
pollution marginal cost curve intersect at point E, then the marginal cost of pollution at that 10 
point is equal to the marginal damage. In an ideal state, the pollution marginal damage curve 11 
and pollution marginal reduction curve will intersect at one point, and this point is the best 12 
emission quantity and the best emission charge point, as illustrated in Figure 1(Tietenberg 13 
and Lewis, 2016). Then, the corresponding amount of pollutant emissions is the best 14 
pollutant emissions. With the best emission target, the managers need to choose the 15 
appropriate method to keep the amount of emissions at the best emissions.  16 
This research focus on the PIEA policy and takes the existing PC policy into account, 17 
payment for initial emission allowance and pollution charge, both of which are costs that 18 
enterprises need to pay for discharging pollutant. In the current total emission control policy, 19 
the amount of emissions set by the government is based on the target quantity that is not 20 
linked with the environmental capacity to date. Therefore, we believe that in this study, the 21 
PIEA policy and PC policy keep pollution at the best emission and that the total emission 22 
control policy exists as an additional condition for limiting pollutant emissions. 23 
As shown in Fig 1, when the emission reaches the best emission point W, the polluter paid 24 
price at t, total fee is W×t, which is composed of areas B and C. Area B lies below the 25 
marginal damage cost curve, meaning that the polluter pays compensation for the damage 26 
caused by the emission. Area C lies over the marginal damage cost curve, so the polluter pays 27 
scarcity rent for acquiring the environmental capacity property resource. Therefore, the 28 
payment from the polluter includes two parts: compensation for pollution damage and 29 
scarcity rent, corresponding to the PC policy and PIEA policy in reality.  30 
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 1 
Fig 1 Emission charge for the best emission quantity 2 
 3 
4. Methodology and Scenarios 4 
4.1. Methodology 5 
This research intends to solve the pricing problem of initial emission allowance and simulates 6 
what will occur when the policy is implemented. After identifying the best pollutant emission 7 
targets to achieve maximum net social benefits, it is necessary to build models to describe the 8 
best pollutant emission, the costs that polluters should pay, and the maximum net social 9 
benefits between these key variables relationships. 10 
In the process of modeling, it is necessary to describe the relationships involved in the micro 11 
and macro levels individually: one of the relationships is each enterprise's response to the 12 
allowance price at the micro-level. The enterprise will account for changes in its earning after 13 
paying for the initial allowance. If the benefit decrease is unacceptable, the enterprise will 14 
adjust its strategy, including adjustment of their product amounts and additional pollution 15 
reduction investment. Another relationship is net social benefits after all enterprises 16 
implement response strategies. Instead of focusing on the benefits of individual enterprises, 17 
policy makers only focus on the net social benefits.  18 
After receiving feedback that the net society benefits have changed, the policy makers will 19 
adjust the initial emission allowance price according to the feedback. This process "pricing 20 
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 9 
— strategy — feedback — price" is constantly cycling until it reaches the optimal goals set 1 
by the policy makers, which is the maximum net social benefit. 2 
According to the research idea, it is necessary to establish a model that describes the 3 
individual enterprise behavior and link the enterprise model with the net social benefits 4 
model. Additionally, the relationships need to be described in the model, including the micro 5 
and macro levels, the long policy implementation time, and the many variables that change 6 
during the execution since the socioeconomic and environmental systems are dynamic. 7 
Therefore, the optimal goal at the beginning of the policy design may become non-optimal 8 
goal in the implementation process. Therefore, the dynamic characteristics of economic 9 
systems and environmental systems should be considered when formulating policy.  10 
In this research, we employ the dynamic optimization model to find the optimal policy 11 
according to the manager’s objectives and realistic conditions, and analyze the impact on the 12 
economy and environment. The dynamic optimal control is a given objective function and 13 
constraint condition, which includes the state that must be achieved at a given time and to 14 
select an optimal time path to achieve the optimal goal, which is actually a multi-stage 15 
decision process in a discrete and continuous time. There are other ways to assess the policy 16 
impact, such as the Input-Output (IO) model and Computable general equilibrium (CGE), but 17 
those methods have limitations. IO can only address linear relationships, non-linear 18 
relationships are not applicable (the relationship between pollutant emissions and amount of 19 
products is not linear in this research); CGE is applicable to non-linearity, but it requires a 20 
number of empirical parameters that are not easily obtained in this research. Finally, the two 21 
methods cannot be applied at the enterprise-level but only in macro industries. 22 
 23 
4.2 Modeling process  24 
According to the efficient allocation of pollution theory, efficiency is achieved when the 25 
marginal cost of control is equal to the marginal damage(Tietenberg and Lewis, 2016). 26 
Corresponding to optimal emission quantity, the manager charges the polluter for fixing the 27 
emission on the optimal quantity. The payments from polluters include two parts: 28 
compensation for pollution damage and scarcity rent, corresponding to PC policy and PIEA 29 
policy. For more details, see SI. 30 
An optimal control-based model, has been widely applied in dynamic pollution regulation 31 
(Biglaiser et al., 1995; Moledina et al., 2003). This method could account for the optimal 32 
objective under a dynamic equilibrium situation. We consider the policy maker and 33 
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 10 
enterprises as two types of players in the modeling process. The policy maker focuses on the 1 
entire social benefit. In this study, the social benefit is the total benefit for the study area from 2 
producing goods plus the environmental value. The environment value shall cover damages 3 
caused by pollution and services provided by the environment(Tietenberg and Lewis, 2016). 4 
Enterprises only focus on their own profits and do not want to take the external cost caused 5 
by discharging pollution to the environment voluntarily. Thus, policy the maker must take 6 
action to internalize the externality caused by pollution damage to the environment. 7 
The approach follows three-stage games of incomplete information. In the first stage, the 8 
policy maker offers a series of PIEA prices according to an area with several enterprises. In 9 
the second stage, enterprises take countermeasures. Increasing costs will decrease the 10 
enterprises’ profits after the PIEA policy has been implemented. Supposing that the 11 
enterprise is an ‘economic man’ who chases the maximum benefit; thus, the enterprise will 12 
take measures if the profit decrease is beyond the acceptable range. Two types of strategies 13 
are available to adopt by the enterprise: adjust the production output or raise the pollution 14 
reduction investment. The enterprise chooses the best suitable measure in accordance with 15 
the maximum profit principle. In the third stage, the policy maker decides which price will 16 
be taken for the benefits. The policy maker will measure the social benefit aimed at every 17 
price and choose the price that will maximize the social benefit. The detailed process is 18 
shown in Fig 2. 19 
 20 
Fig 2 Modeling process of IEA pricing 21 
The price model is based on the dynamic optimal control theory(Chiang, 2000). The 22 
modeling process refers to Biglaiser’s research(Biglaiser et al., 1995) and modifies several of 23 
the items to be applicable to a realistic situation. The process can be expressed with an 24 
 
 
true
false
false
true
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
 11 
enterprise with two control variables, which are the production output       and the 1 
pollution reduction investment   , and one state variable, which is the facility running fee 2 
     . The enterprise’s optimal objective is to maximum enterprise profit. The policy maker 3 
has one control variable, which is the PIEA price     .  4 
The enterprise profit is equal to sales income deducted by production cost, pollution 5 
treatment cost, and possible expenditure additional pollution reduction investment.  6 
                                                                            (1) 
 7 
For the period from 0 to T, the discount rate is       . Assuming that the capital 8 
depreciation rate will not affect the result, the enterprise profit for a given time path is 9 
 
          
 
 
                           
(2) 
           10 
St.              . 11 
In this equation,   is the PC price  , the PIEA price   or    . 12 
According to optimal control theory, the enterprise profit Hamiltonian function is 13 
                                      (3) 
The optimal objective is maximum social benefit. The existing study defines social benefits 14 
as the income minus damages caused by emissions (Perman et al., 2003). The social benefit 15 
function considers the following parts:  16 
                                                                  
                  
(4) 
Given a perfect competition market, social benefit can be presented as the sum of discounted 17 
enterprises’ benefit minus the pollution damage, exclusive of emission taxes or profit from 18 
emission trading, since these represent only transfers between enterprises or between 19 
enterprises and the government (Biglaiser et al., 1995). 20 
Under a perfectly competitive market, the social benefit could be presented as the sum of the 21 
enterprise discount profit subtracted by the pollution damage. The revenue from PIEA is not 22 
calculated because this part is the transfer payment from the enterprise and government. At 23 
the same time, the social benefit cost function is               . Assuming pollution 24 
damage to environment is linear: 25 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
 12 
 
            
 
             
 
 
(5) 
In this equation,   is the marginal emission damage coefficient. 1 
For a period from 0 to T, the social benefit is 2 
 
                                     
  
 
 
 (6) 
The social benefit Hamiltonian function is 3 
                                      (7) 
In this study, the COD and NH3-N PIEA prices are set as two independent variables, which 4 
are all calculated in the emission cost. We use a subscript to distinguish COD and NH3-N. 5 
The bivariate pollutant extended model and the details of multiple polluters extending the 6 
model process are presented in SI. Further details are provided in SI. 7 
4.3 Scenarios 8 
In this study, we focus on three policies: the payment for initial emission allowance (PIEA) 9 
policy, pollution charge (PC) policy and total emission control (TEC) policy. The previous 10 
theory analysis has clarified the difference between PC and PIEA. PC means the polluter 11 
pays to compensate for the damage caused by the emissions. PIEA means the polluter pays 12 
scarcity rent for acquiring the environmental capacity property resource. For enterprises, both 13 
PIEA and PC are expenditures that have no difference. Both costs are also calculated as 14 
emission costs. The TEC policy is implemented as a penalty function(Weitzman, 1978), see 15 
in SI. 16 
We take a realistic situation as the baseline and set four scenarios. In scenario 1 (S1), only the 17 
PIEA policy is implemented. The scenario 1 setting is used to compare with the scenarios 18 
when PIEA is combined with PC. In scenario 2 (S2), PIEA and PC are implemented 19 
simultaneously, which is the simulation mimicking reality. The previous theory analysis 20 
discussed that PC requires compensation for the damage by emissions to the environment and 21 
PIEA requires scarcity rent to be paid for acquiring environmental capacity property 22 
resources. However, it is difficult to distinguish because it is an emission discharge cost 23 
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expenditure for the enterprise. The charge for the best emission amount is consistent with the 1 
compensation for emission damage and scarcity rent. The remaining part is the scarcity rent if 2 
the existing pollution charge is deducted. In scenarios 3 and 4 (S3, S4), the TEC policy is 3 
added based on scenarios 1 and 2 separately. The equations for the scenarios are as follows: 4 
Scenario 1: PIEA  5 
According to Equation (2), enterprise   profit is: 6 
 
                       
             
            
 
 
    
(8) 
The Hamiltonian function is: 7 
                       
             
                 (9) 
Scenario 2: PIEA+PC 8 
According to Equation (2), enterprise   profit is: 9 
 
                       
             
             
        
 
 
     
                
(10) 
The Hamiltonian function is: 10 
                       
             
             
        
     
                 
(11) 
Scenario 3: PIEA+TEC 11 
The function is the same as in scenario 1, and the TEC policy is implemented as a penalty 12 
function. 13 
Scenario 4: PIEA+PC+TEC 14 
The function is similar to scenario 2, and the TEC policy is implemented as a penalty 15 
function. 16 
4.4 Implementation algorithm 17 
The preceding paragraph describes the process of establishing an initial emission allowance 18 
pricing model and to develop the theoretical general model into the model is applicable for 19 
two pollutants based on realistic needs. The maximum value principle is the first-order 20 
necessary condition in the optimal control theory to obtain the optimal value, which is used to 21 
solve a constrained pan-extremes problem. In the theoretical model, we determine the 22 
analytical solution based on the maximum principle. 23 
According to formula A, the     value is determined by   . The expression of    is 24 
non-linear, therefore there is no analytical solution for    . This means that the maximum 25 
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value principle becomes no longer applicable to solve the partial differential equations. 1 
Although there is no analytical solution, we attempt to use software tools and algorithms to 2 
achieve its numerical solution. 3 
In this research, we employed the BFGS-PSO
†
 two-layer nestification algorithm to obtain 4 
the optimal object numerical solution(Møller, 1993; Poli et al., 2007) and take MATLAB 5 
software as the computational tool. We determine which PIEA price combination by    and 6 
   can achieve the optimal social benefit. We employed a two-layer nestification algorithm 7 
to solve the two optimal problems. 8 
 9 
Fig 3 Two-layer nestification algorithm 10 
As seen in Fig 3, the two-layer nestification algorithm is comprised of the optimal bottom 11 
layer and optimal top layer. We used the PIEA price    and    in the bottom layer to 12 
determine product quantity    and abatement investment   , which can achieve the 13 
enterprise optimal profit using the optimal pollutant discharging function. Next, we identified 14 
the top optimal PIEA price combination    and   , which can achieve the social benefit 15 
using the optimal bottom layer. The bottom layer uses the BFGS algorithm. The top layer 16 
uses the Particle Swarm Optimization algorithm. 17 
 18 
5. Data Collection 19 
                                                 
† BFGS: Broyden, Fletcher, Goldfarb, Shanno; PSO: Particle Swarm Optimization. 
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5.1. Data source 1 
The department implementing PIEA policy coincides with the administrative jurisdiction 2 
range. Thus, the PC and TEC policy implementing areas additionally correspond to the 3 
administrative jurisdiction range, dividing China to province and municipality level regions 4 
as sample sets. This study involves 31 regions in the mainland of China (provinces, 5 
municipalities, and autonomous regions). The data of the empirical simulation is based on the 6 
China Environmental Statistics Database in 2013. The data contain 3 categories, 39 industries, 7 
and 30,865 enterprises’ information on energy and raw material consumption information, 8 
production, and pollutant emission information. The study also employs the total pollutant 9 
emissions for each region from the Ministry of Environmental Protection Total Emission 10 
Reduction Database set in 2013, pollution charge standard for each region (latest standard), 11 
emission standard for each industry (latest standard), and gross profit rate for each industry in 12 
2013. 13 
 14 
5.2. Data processing 15 
The price model involves many other data, which cannot be obtained directly. Thus, the 16 
following parameters and coefficients are calculated based on existing samples: 17 
(1) Calculate the pollution discharge coefficients by establishing a model describing the 18 
correlations among polluter emissions and product output and presents the value of 19 
abatement investment(Biglaiser et al., 1995), then change it to a regression model with 20 
regression samples from the China Environmental Statistics Database in 2013. 21 
(2) The PIEA price model needs the treatment cost for each pollutant separately, but the 22 
facility running fee from the environmental statistics data is for all pollutants. We adopted the 23 
cost allocation approach to separate treatment costs for each pollutant(Wang, 2005). 24 
(3) Calculate each enterprise’s production cost, using the industrial average gross profit rate 25 
to calculate the enterprise product cost(Helfert, 2001). 26 
(4) After sample screening and trial calculation, we choose the function form and variables to 27 
establish the regression equation according to past studies(Friedler and Pisanty, 2006; 28 
Gonzalez-Serrano et al., 2005; Tsagarakis et al., 2003). Then, we obtain the marginal 29 
pollution treatment cost through the marginal treatment cost function(Dasgupta et al., 1996).    30 
(5) Calculate the marginal damage for the region. 31 
(6) TEC constrains the pollution quantity to each region every year. 32 
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The data and coefficients involved are as follows: production cost, treatment cost, cost 1 
allocation, emission coefficients, region pollutant emission target, pollution charge standard, 2 
pollution control investment, pollution treatment cost function, marginal treatment cost, and 3 
region marginal damage, see in SI. 4 
 5 
6. Results and Discussion 6 
6.1. Optimal social benefits 7 
The objective of the PIEA optimal model is to achieve maximum social benefit. Therefore, 8 
social benefit is the key point of focus in this study. The empirical simulation result shows 9 
the social benefit, as shown in Fig 4. The social benefit after charging the PIEA fee is 10 
approximately 50% of social benefit compared with baseline. The present model only 11 
considers pollutant emission damage to the environment and does not take into account the 12 
profit for pollutant emission reducing, such as ecological service function and effect on 13 
human health. 14 
 15 
 16 
Fig 4 Social benefit comparison between mean and baseline 17 
To clarify the difference in the social benefit in the four policy scenarios, we used the paired 18 
t-test to compare the results in Table 1. First, we tested S1–S2 and S3–S4 paired t-tests 19 
separately to determine whether the PIEA-only policy scenario and PIEA in combination 20 
with PC policy scenario can achieve equal social benefits. Table 1 shows the social benefit 21 
paired t-tests for the four scenarios. There is no significant difference observed for the social 22 
benefit in S1–S2 and S3–S4. Therefore, only the PIEA implemented and PIEA in 23 
combination with PC scenarios can achieve equal social benefit. Second, we performed 24 
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S1–S3 and S2–S4 paired t-tests to determine whether the TEC policy will affect the social 1 
benefit. When the TEC policy is implemented, there is a significant difference in social 2 
benefit with the scenario without the TEC policy. Looking back at the results in Fig 4, the 3 
social benefit in the scenario without the TEC policy is higher than the scenario with the TEC 4 
policy. This result indicates that the social benefit will decrease with the TEC policy.  5 
 6 
Table 1 Social benefit paired t-test 7 
Item Variable Obs MeanDiff t 
Social benefit 
S1–S2 31 3.258065 t = 0.3697 
S3–S4 31 20.09677 t = 0.1110 
S1–S3 31 130840.3 t = 2.0656** 
S2–S4 31 130857.2 t = 2.0663** 
 8 
 9 
6.2. Best pollutant emission 10 
Next, the best pollutant emission corresponding to the social benefit is shown. Fig 5 and Fig 11 
6 display the simulated annual emissions of the two pollutants on average for the four 12 
scenarios compared to the baseline.  13 
 14 
Fig 5 COD emission comparison between mean and baseline 15 
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 1 
Fig 6 NH3-N emission comparison between mean and baseline 2 
From Fig 5, we know that most of the regions’ emissions are decreased from the baseline, 3 
especially Yunnan, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia and Xinjiang, which are the top five regions in 4 
the emission depression percentage ranking. This result means that after being charged the 5 
payment for the initial emission allowance, the enterprises’ discharge costs increased, so the 6 
pollution from the enterprises in most regions decreased. Unexpectedly, Beijing, Shanghai, 7 
Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, and Guangdong, had emission quantities greater than 8 
the baseline. We inferred that for most of the enterprises in the regions whose emission are 9 
greater than the baseline, if their marginal profit caused by pollutant emissions per ton are 10 
higher than the PIEA expenditure, then the enterprises choose to increase pollutant emissions. 11 
Another interesting finding in Fig 6 is that excluding Inner Mongolia, Hubei, Hunan, Tibet, 12 
Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, and Xinjiang, the NH3-N emissions after paying the PIEA fee show 13 
an increasing trend for the remaining regions. This result is probably due to the major 14 
pollution of enterprises in each region and the treatment facilities for major pollution. Some 15 
enterprises mainly emit COD, whereas the NH3-N generation quantity is lower than that of 16 
COD. Thus, the pollution treatment facility is primarily for COD and the NH3-N reduction is 17 
a synergistic effect (we can infer that the treatment facility is mainly aimed at allocating 18 
pollution treatment efficiency).  19 
In Table 2, we also list the S1–S2, S3–S4, S1–S3, and S2–S4 paired t-tests for the best COD 20 
and NH3-N emissions to discuss the differences between several scenarios. S1–S2 and S3–S4 21 
paired t-tests are for testing if the PC policy will affect best emission quantity. S1–S3 and 22 
S2–S4 paired t-tests are for testing if the TEC policy will affect the best emission quantity. 23 
S1–S2 and S3–S4 paired t-tests show that the best emission quantities have no differences 24 
whether PC is implemented or not. In other words, the best emission quantities are equal 25 
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 19 
regardless of the PC policy implementation. This result means both PIEA policy strategy and 1 
PIEA plus PC policy strategy will achieve similar best emission quantities. S1-S3 and S2–S4 2 
paired t-tests show that the TEC policy has a significant effect on the best emission quantity. 3 
The COD emission quantity with TEC is lower than that without the TEC policy. However, 4 
the effect of NH3-N emissions is not significant whether TEC is implemented. 5 
Table 2 Best pollutant emission paired t-test 6 
 7 
Item Variable Obs MeanDiff t 
Best COD 
emission 
S1–S2 31 10.15589 t = 0.9137 
S3–S4 31 49.16717 t = 1.3466 
S1–S3 31 3423.794 t = 2.0729** 
S2–S4 31 3462.806 t = 2.0980** 
Best NH3-N 
emission 
S1–S2 31 4361.168 t = 1.0016 
S3–S4 31 -7.652266 t = -1.6471 
S1–S3 31 4480.461 t = 1.0222 
S2–S4 31 111.641 t = 0.9029 
 8 
6.3. Initial emission allowance price 9 
The price is the key point of the PIEA policy. Fig 7 displays the price of the initial emission 10 
allowance in the four scenarios for each region. Comparing the price of the four scenarios, S1 11 
is higher than S2 and S3 is higher than S4. The result is related to the scenario setting. S1 and 12 
S3 only included the PIEA policy, while S2 and S4 included the PC policy in addition to 13 
PIEA. Reviewing previous discussion shows that the charge for the best emission quantity is 14 
constituted by damage compensation and scarcity rent. If the charge is deducted by the 15 
existing PC price, then the remaining part is the PIEA price. Next, the portion of the S1 price 16 
that is higher than S2 is the pollution charge. S3 is higher than S4 for the same reason. 17 
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 1 
Fig 7 COD initial emission allowance price of each region in S1–S4 2 
 3 
Fig 8 NH3-N initial emission allowance price for each region in S1–S4 4 
Interestingly, the initial allowance price of NH3-N in some regions was found to be zero, as 5 
shown in Fig 8. In the modeling process, we set the price of the COD and NH3-N initial 6 
allowance as two independent variables, to avoid duplicating charges to different pollutants 7 
discharged by the same enterprise under the existing synergistic control effect. When the 8 
enterprises adjust the output of product, the amount of pollutants will also be changed. 9 
Depending on the enterprise and the production process, some products discharge both COD 10 
and NH3-N contaminants, but the production process of others discharges a single 11 
contaminant, such as only COD or NH3-N. For products that discharge two contaminants 12 
simultaneously, if the enterprise adjusts the product output, the amount of both pollutants will 13 
change in a collinear trend. In this way, if adjust the emission of one pollutant, then the other 14 
associated pollutant emission will also be changed. For enterprises discharging two pollutants 15 
simultaneously, if charge is for one pollutant for emission control, the other associated 16 
pollutant emission will be under control also. Therefore, the model provides the simulation 17 
results: if most of the enterprises discharge COD and NH3-N simultaneously in one region, 18 
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 21 
then only charging for the COD emission allowance, or charging for NH3-N according to the 1 
ratio of NH3-N discharged by the only NH3-N emission enterprises to total NH3-N emission 2 
in the region, can achieve the region's optimal social benefit. This explains why the NH3-N 3 
price in some regions is lower than the COD price, or even zero. 4 
Next, the TEC policy effect on price is discussed. As shown in Fig 7 and Fig 8, the price 5 
trend of S3 and S4 considering the TEC policy are obviously different from S1 and S2. The 6 
COD price in S1 is higher than S3. Moreover, the COD price in S2 is higher than in S4. The 7 
NH3-N price shows an opposite trend, that S1 is lower than S3, and the NH3-N prices in some 8 
regions are zero. According to the principle of optimal social benefits, a model should charge 9 
treatment facilities producing major pollutants. When considering the TEC policy that is 10 
restricted by a target emission, the model calculation should determine the best emission 11 
quantities in close proximity to the emission target as principle. According to the best 12 
emission quantities in Fig 6, when pollutants emissions are beyond the restricted target, the 13 
beyond part will be “punished”. Thus, the NH3-N price considering the TEC policy is higher 14 
than that without the TEC policy. When the region’s total NH3-N emission is beyond the 15 
restricted target, the enterprises in the region must pay for NH3-N at a high price. Remember 16 
that the treatment facilities have a synergistic effect on COD and NH3-N, which means if the 17 
NH3-N emission is controlled, then COD will be controlled. So, if the enterprises pay for the 18 
NH3-N emission at a high price, then they could pay for COD at a low price.  19 
 20 
6.4 Difference of price for pollutants compared to the pollution charge 21 
If the difference of price for S1 and S2 is equal to the pollution charge fee, then we 22 
demonstrate the previous hypothesis: to achieve the best emission under the optimal social 23 
benefit, the cost paid by the enterprise should include the compensation for environmental 24 
damages and scarcity rents gained by the enterprises that are using the environmental 25 
capacity. However, in reality, only compensation for the environmental damage was charged, 26 
the scarcity rents were missed. The model setting in this research calculates the scarcity rents 27 
deducting the pollution charge, the PIEA policy compensates for the missing scarcity rents. 28 
To demonstrate that the differences between S1 and S2, S3 and S4 are caused by the 29 
pollution charge, we did paired t-tests for the difference of S1 minus S2 to the pollution 30 
charge, and S3 minus S4 to the pollution charge, as shown in Table 3. According to the paired 31 
t-test results,  S1 minus S2 and S3 minus S4 exhibit no significant difference with the 32 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
 22 
pollution charge. This condition suggests that the PIEA price for scenarios regardless of the 1 
PC policy always achieves the optimal social benefits. The empirical results support the 2 
PIEA theory that the price difference of S1–S2 and S3–S4 should be the PC price. 3 
Table 3 Difference in two scenarios’ emissions PIEA prices compared to the pollution charge 4 
price paired t-test 5 
Item Variable Obs MeanDiff t 
Difference of two 
scenarios’ COD PUER 
price with EC price 
S1–S2 with EC price 31 -0.0593548 t = -1.9816 
S3–S4 with EC price 31 -0.0487097 t = -1.2884 
Difference of two 
scenarios’ NH3-N PUER 
price with EC price 
S1–S2 with EC price 31 -0.1774194 t = -2.9543 
S3–S4 with EC price 31 -0.06 t = -1.5030 
From the result, we know that whether PIEA is implemented or PIEA in combination with 6 
PC, the two types of scenarios can achieve equal social benefits. We can infer that no matter 7 
what kind of policy, they achieve equivalent optimal social benefits. Therefore, in the PIEA 8 
and PC mixed policy, the combination policy can achieve the optimal social benefit in the 9 
current condition. Therefore, in this policy design, PIEA is complimenting a missing part of 10 
the optimal pollution charge rather than duplicating it with PC. 11 
In the model assumption, the investment will be placed in existing facilities if the enterprise 12 
decides to invest more to improve the treatment efficiency, which means improving the 13 
existing facilities, rather than adding new facilities. A disparity exists between the 14 
assumption and reality. Adding new facilities or processes is not easy. Many factors need to 15 
be considered when adding new facilities, such as the enterprise pollution generation quantity. 16 
The treatment process is constrained by the concentration if a new process is implemented in 17 
an existing structure or new structure. All of the problems should be discussed according to a 18 
concrete case, rather than a general summary. Thus, in the model assumption, the effects 19 
caused by investment improved the existing treatment facility efficiency. By employing this 20 
process, an enterprise for which the primary pollutant is COD (NH3-N is synergistic pollutant) 21 
chooses to improve the production output. Next, NH3-N generation will increase. However, 22 
the facilities aimed at NH3-N have not been improved. This factor will result in an NH3-N 23 
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emission increase. Thus, the result is a warning because of insufficient treatment capabilities. 1 
NH3-N emissions will increase after PIEA is implemented if new treatment facilities are not 2 
added. 3 
 4 
7 Conclusions and Policy Implications 5 
7.1. Conclusions 6 
We establish an optimal control-based model with COD and NH3-N, two independent 7 
pollutants variables, to calculate the initial emission allowance price in PIEA policy and 8 
simulate the results after the policy is applied. At the same time, we illustrate the impact of 9 
pre-existing policies on the performance of the PIEA policy. Using data containing 3 10 
categories, 39 industries, and 30,865 enterprises samples, we obtain the optimal social benefit, 11 
the best pollutant emissions, and the initial emission allowance price.  12 
First, because PIEA policy increases the enterprises’ discharging cost, most regions’ COD 13 
emissions are less than the baseline. However, there are exceptions, Beijing, Shanghai, 14 
Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, and Guangdong, in which emission quantities are 15 
greater than the baseline. We inferred that in the case when the marginal profit caused by 16 
pollutant emissions per ton are higher than the PIEA expenditure, the enterprises choose to 17 
increase pollutant emissions. For the other case of water pollutants, the NH3-N emission 18 
shows an opposite trend. The simulation result is that excluding Inner Mongolia, Hubei, 19 
Hunan, Tibet, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, and Xinjiang, the NH3-N emissions in the rest of 20 
regions are increased. We inferred the reason is that the pollution treatment facility is mainly 21 
for COD and the NH3-N reduction is a synergistic effect. 22 
Second, whether only the PIEA policy or PIEA combined with the PC policy, both types of 23 
policy can achieve equal optimal social benefits and best pollutant emissions. However, the 24 
initial emission allowance price in S1 that only implements the PIEA policy is higher than the 25 
price in S2, where PIEA is combined with the PC policy. By paired t-test, we inferred that 26 
there is no significant difference between the price difference between S1 and S2 and the 27 
pollution charge price. At the same time, the price of the NH3-N initial allowance in some 28 
regions was zero. We set the COD and NH3-N initial allowance prices as two independent 29 
variables to avoid the duplicated charges to different pollutants discharged by the same 30 
enterprise under the existing synergistic control effect. 31 
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Third, the COD emission quantity with TEC is lower than that without the TEC policy, 1 
Therefore, the TEC policy will be effective for pollutant emission control. At the same time, 2 
the TEC policy will also affect price. The TEC policy means that regions have their own 3 
target emissions, and when the emission is beyond the restricted target, the beyond part will 4 
be “punished”. Then, the pollutant beyond the restricted target will be charged a payment for 5 
IEA at a higher price than without the TEC policy. 6 
7.2 Policy implications 7 
In this study, the pricing method for initial allowance in the PIEA policy considers the 8 
existing pollution charge policy. When the PIEA policy has not been implemented, only a 9 
pollution charge is not sufficient to achieve the best pollutant emissions. In the pricing 10 
method designed, the initial allowance fee and the pollution charges are combined to achieve 11 
the best pollutant emissions. This study proves that under the pricing method designed, the 12 
PIEA policy is not a duplicate policy of the pollution charge, but rather a supplement to the 13 
existing pollution charge for achieving the best emission discharge. 14 
According the result that the social benefit after being charged the PIEA fee with TEC is 15 
lower than without it, we can infer that the social benefit will lose economic efficiency with 16 
the TEC policy. Although economic efficiency is lost under the TEC policy, it necessary for 17 
the areas whose pollutant emission increase after being charged the PIEA fee because the 18 
increment of pollutants will be higher than without the TEC policy. 19 
In reality, certain enterprises’ pollution treatment facilities are primarily for COD, and the 20 
NH3-N reduction is a synergistic effect. The simulation results indicate that under the 21 
assumption that enterprises invest in the existing facilities instead of adding new facilities, 22 
the NH3-N emission will increase because of insufficient treatment capability. Thus, the 23 
NH3-N emission will increase after PIEA is implemented if new treatment facilities are not 24 
added. The government should increase treatment facilities for NH3-N.  25 
The effect of economic policy is inclined to screen higher marginal benefit income 26 
enterprises which use emission allowances rather than reducing pollutant emissions. Some 27 
regions’ pollutant emissions will increase even if charged PIEA fees, meanwhile other 28 
regions’ pollutant emissions will decrease after being charged. Therefore, the policy maker 29 
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should take into consideration the appropriate time for launching a new policy in the whole 1 
nation because a new policy may induce an economic recession. 2 
 3 
7.3. Research limitation 4 
There are some inadequacies in this research. In the social benefit model, only the recovery 5 
cost method is used to calculate the damage caused by the pollutants discharged into the 6 
environment, and the damage to the ecological environment and human health is not 7 
considered. The heterogeneous pollutants effects on human health and ecological service is 8 
related to the place where the point source is located. The point source location belonging to 9 
which environmental function zone should be determined following the discharge standards 10 
and considering the effects of the pollution source on the humans living in the area and the 11 
surrounding ecological environment. Not enough information on the human living nearby 12 
and the ecological environment surrounding the pollution source were available to support 13 
calculations in this research. Therefore, we use the cost for removing pollutants discharged to 14 
the environment the pollutant damage effect instead of the costs to the ecological 15 
environment and to human health. Similarly, the income caused by the environmental quality 16 
improvement is not included. 17 
In the model assumptions, there are some simplified situations, such as when the firm 18 
determines its product output, they do not consider the market equilibrium of the product 19 
supply and demand, and keep the price stable. In the simulation of enterprises 20 
decision-making behavior, some details cannot be shown. There are three ways to reduce 21 
pollutant emissions for enterprises: promoting the production process technology, updating 22 
the end of pipe technology, and improving the efficiency of the existing facilities; but in the 23 
model, the emission reduction method is only the improvement of efficiency of the existing 24 
facilities, technological progress has not yet been considered. 25 
Due to lacking fixed investment data for pollutant treatment facilities, all the parameters 26 
involved in the pollution reduction cost in this study are based on the operating costs of the 27 
enterprises' pollution abatement facilities. The state variables in the model are the only 28 
present emissions reduction facility operating costs in this part. 29 
The empirical simulation result has finite precision because of model simplification and lack 30 
of data. The model has been simplified for curving the complicated realistic situation under 31 
certain hypotheses. Thus, in the future, we will take the pollutant emission effect on human 32 
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health and the ecological service function into consideration as components of the social 1 
benefit. 2 
 3 
Supporting Information  4 
Additional information includes details on data, modeling process, parameters and 5 
implementation algorithms. This material is available free of charge via the Internet at 6 
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